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Identifying whether an exogenous factor affects R&D from a demand side or 
from a supply side is an important issue. This paper, first, theoretically 
shows that a favorable change in either side can reduce the R&D 
productivity in equilibrium, so that the reduced form estimation cannot 
provide a clear identification. Secondly, it estimates both structural and 
reduced form patent production functions, based on instrumental variables 
approach, using a large database on Japanese firms. According to the 
estimation, while the initial firm size, market concentration or export 
orientation increases R&D, none of them significantly shifts the structural 
patent production function.   
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I Introduction 
There exist supply and demand side channels through which an exogenous 
factor affects research and development (R&D) of a firm. We define the 
channel in which the marginal revenue from a given technology is affected as 
a demand side channeli and that in which the marginal cost of technology 
production is affected as a supply side channel. A large firm may do more 
R&D since its ability to appropriate the benefit of R&D is high. It may also 
do more R&D due to the availability of a larger firm-specific knowledge 
stockii. Similarly, export opportunities enhance appropriability of R&D for a 
firm, but it may also enhance R&D by facilitating international technology 
spilloveriii.A similar point may also apply to the effects of market structure. 
Competitive market structure may affect the demand by a firm for R&D by 
strengthening its strategic motivation, by reducing the replacement effect or 
by reducing the appropriability of R&Div. It may also affect R&D from a 
supply-side by influencing R&D efficiency (see Nelson and Winter (1982)).     
  This paper aims at identifying the channels by which such factors as 
firm size affect R&D and its productivity. While firm size, market structure 
as well as export orientation of a firm are partially endogenous variables 
with respect to R&D, we attempt to control these endogeneity by using an 
instrumental variable (the age of a firm as an instrument for the initial firm 
size) and by introducing three-digit industry dummies. In addition we focus 
here on the effects of the levels of these causal variables in the beginning of 
the period on the flow R&D expenditure and its output in that period, as 
much of existing empirical literature doesv. The identification of demand and  3
supply channels is important both for public policy and for management 
strategy. As pointed out by Cohen and Klepper (1996), lower (average) R&D 
productivity of a large firm does not necessarily imply that it is less efficient 
in R&D than a small firm. It may only reflect the combination of an 
appropriability advantage of such firm, i.e. its stronger capability of making 
profit by commercializing a given technology, and a deceasing return of R&D 
investment. With respect to a policy choice, if export opportunities affect 
R&D primarily through a demand side channel, export subsidy will be hard 
to be justified globally, since it will become a zero-sum game from a global 
perspective.  
  A standard productivity analysis may suggest the following 
identification approach, assuming that a R&D performing firm recovers the 
cost of R&D primarily through internal manufacturing. If an exogenous 
R&D determinant is found to increase the R&D output but to reduce the 
R&D productivity, we may identify that with a positive demand side change. 
On the other hand, if it is found to increase both the R&D output and the 
R&D productivity, we may identify that with a positive supply side change. 
However, such approach is based on a wrong theoretical basis, since 
improved technological opportunities for R&D can actually cause the 
equilibrium R&D productivity to decline, as shown in this paper. 
Consequently, a reduced form estimation of R&D productivity equation, 
which is used in most existing empirical studies, cannot provide a definitive 
conclusion on the identification.   
Given this theoretical result, we directly estimate a structural patent  4
equation, using an instrumental variable approach. The comparison with the 
results of reduced form estimation would enable us to distinguish the direct 
effects of, for an example, market structure on patent production from its 
indirect effect through its effect on the level of R&D. We use corporate debt 
(relative to the total asset size) and the advertising expenditure (relative to 
the total sales) as instruments for R&D investment in the structural patent 
equation, since they do not directly affect technological opportunities faced 
by a firm. Thus, if market structure does not shift the structural patent 
production function, we can rule out the supply side channel in its effect. In 
addition, if market structure is found to affect patent production in its 
reduced form, we may conclude that it affects R&D only from the demand 
side.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews 
briefly the existing work. Section three presents an analytical framework 
and theoretical results. Section four describes the empirical framework and 
the data used in the estimation. Section five presents estimation results. 
Section six concludes. 
 
II Existing literature 
There exists a large volume of empirical work on the determinants of R&D, 
especially focusing on the relationship between R&D on the one hand and 
firm size and market structure on the other, substantially stimulated by the 
writings of Schumpeter (1942)vi.    According to Cohen (1995), there are three 
stylized empirical facts established from these worksvii.  5
(1) Among R&D performing firms, R&D tends to increase, often 
proportionately, with firm size in most industriesviii. 
(2) R&D average productivity tends to decline with firm size among R&D 
performing firms. 
(3) While R&D intensity tends to be high in industries with higher 
concentration, inter-industry differences in technological opportunities 
and demand growth account for most of the variations in R&D intensity.   
    Recently, theoretical literature has attempted to systematically 
analyze how a structural model of R&D can contribute to explaining these 
empirical findings consistently. Cohen and Klepper (1996) have presented a 
theoretical model emphasizing a demand side or appropriability of R&D, 
which may consistently explain the above two empirical propositions. In 
their model a large firm conducts more R&D since it can apply the R&D 
output for a larger sale, and its R&D productivity is lower due to a declining 
schedule of average R&D productivity. Klette and Griliches (2000) present a 
quality ladder model explaining both of the first two propositions as well as 
the Gibrat’s law. In their model, the initial production cost of a firm and 
interest rate affects its R&D from the demand side, and its efficiency in 
conducting R&D affects its R&D from the supply side. The level of R&D of a 
firm has a proportional relationship with its size in their analysis, if the 
following opposing forces cancel each other out. On the one hand a large firm 
has a stronger incentive to do R&D since it can gain more from the same 
amount of R&D due to its larger output size. On the other it faces higher cost 
of doing R&D due to increasing difficulty in achieving technical progress in  6
the technology frontier.   
    In the empirical front, however, most studies have relied on reduced 
form estimation in evaluating the effects of firm size and market structure 
on R&D and innovations. Acs and Audretsch (1990) provide some evidence 
for a positive effect of competitive market structure on R&D productivity 
based on cross-section data of US industries in reduced form estimation. 
However, they do not control industry fixed effects, so that the causality 
between innovation and market structure is not clear. Geroski (1990) 
controls such industry effects in his reduced form estimation of innovation 
equations, and finds that competitive market structure enhances 
innovations, based on the panel data of UK industries. Neither of these two 
studies addresses the question of whether such effect works through demand 
or supply side.   
Cohen and Klepper (1996) in their empirical part have presented 
evidence showing that the overall firm size has little effect on a firm’s R&D 
once business unit size is controlled for. They interpret this evidence as well 
as the above first two stylized facts as supporting the cost spreading model or 
the view that a large firm size provides an appropriability advantage. 
Although such evidence is useful in rejecting some hypotheses on R&D 
determinants such as the financial capability of a firm, a firm-wide scope 
economy or its risk pooling capability, it is not sufficient to determine 
whether the size of a firm in each business line affects its R&D through 
appropriability channel or through supply side channel such as the 
availability of firm specific knowledge. More recently, Blundell et al (1999)  7
shows that a larger market share positively affects innovation, while higher 
concentration has a negative effect, based on the panel data of the British 
firms. Again, they depend on a reduced form estimation of innovations 
equation. Besides, in their analysis the market share variable may have 
picked up the effect of firm size on R&D, since the capital stock variable 
introduced as a control variable for firm size is not found to be statistically 
significant. The study by Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show the existence 
of economy of scope in R&D, based on the project level data in 
pharmaceutical industry.  While their study is based on the structural 
patent production function, it does not control the endogeneity of R&D and 
the other explanatory variables. 
III Theoretical analysis   
In this section, we analyze how R&D productivity responds to the changes in 
the exogenous variables on demand and supply sides. We define those factors 
that affect the marginal revenue from a given technology as demand side 
factors and those that affect the marginal cost of technology production as 
supply side factors. We use a standard theoretical model of R&D, based on 
the assumption that each firm sells a differentiated product and 
appropriates the return from R&D only through internal manufacturing. We 
denote the amount of new technology generated by Z which is assumed to be 
proportional to the number of patents and the R&D investment by rd. Thus, 
the structural patent production function is given by 
) , ( b rd Z Z =                                        ( 1 )  
with b being an efficiency parameter of the patent production function or a  8
supply side factor for R&D ( 0 / ) , ( > ∂ ∂ b b rd Z ). The marginal cost of patent 
production and the marginal productivity of R&D are given respectively 
by Z rd b Z MC ∂ ∂ = / ) ( ) , (  and  ) ( / rd Z MZ ∂ ∂ = . We assume that  0 / < ∂ ∂ b MC . 
    The value of R&D investment is given by 
) , ( ) , , ( ) , , , ( b Z rd a q Z R b a q Z V − =                        ( 2 )  
, where  ) , , ( a q Z R  represents a gross profit, q is the output of a firm and a 
represents a demand side factor of R&D ( 0 / ) , , ( > ∂ ∂ a a q Z R ). We assume 
that 0 / ) , , (
2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ a Z a q Z R . The profit maximizing Z or a reduced form patent 
function is given from (2) by 
) , ( b a Z Z R R =                                      ( 3 )  
and the reduced form R&D function is given by 
) , ( ) ), , ( ( b a rd b b a Z rd rd R R R = =                          ( 4 )  
The total derivative of the marginal (average) productivity of R&D is 
given from (1) by   
) ( ) ( / ) , ( ) ( / ) , ( ) (
2 2 2 rd d rd b rd Z bdb rd b rd Z MZ d ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ = .              ( 5 )  
)) /( ) ( )( ( ) / ( ) ( rd rd d AZ MZ db b AZ AZ d − + ∂ ∂ = .                       ( 6 )  
The first term of both equations is equal to zero for a change in a demand 
side factor. For a shock increasing the demand for R&D output (and 
therefore R&D investment rd), the second term is negative in the case of 
declining marginal (average) productivity of R&Dix. Thus, we have the 
following proposition.   
 
Proposition 1 
If a patent production function exhibits declining marginal (average)  9
productivity with respect to R&D investment, any positive change increasing 
the demand for R&D reduces marginal (average) productivity of R&D 
investment.  
Let us turn to a supply side factor for R&D. A favorable supply side 
change such as an improved technological opportunity increases the 
marginal productivity of R&D investment for a given level of R&D 
investment, and it may also increases the level of R&D. Since the latter 
effect reduces the marginal R&D productivity, the net effect on productivity 
depends on which of the two effects is stronger. As shown below, the marginal 
productivity in equilibrium can decline, due to the dominance of the 
investment effect (see Appendix 1 for a formal proof).   
Let us consider the case of cost-reducing innovation. We postulate 
that R&D investment reduces the (constant) marginal cost of production of 
the firm by the amount of Z (or the number of patents), that is, there is no 
diminishing return in the technical effect of a patent, although there is a 
diminishing return in patent production. A firm chooses Z and the output 
level q to maximize its profit. Let us consider the effects of the downward 
shift of the MC curve of a patent production (from b’ to b” in Figure 1). The 
marginal revenue (MR) of Z is constant for a given q, as illustrated by the flat 
MR(Z,q) curve in Figure 1. As a result, the downward shift of the MC curve 
does not reduce the marginal cost of patent production in the equilibrium, for 
a given output q (compare the point A and the point B). In addition, larger Z 
causes the expansion of q (from q’ to q’’), since it reduces the marginal cost of 
production and the profit-maximizing level of output. Consequently, the MR  10
curve shifts up, as shown in Figure 1. Thus, a favorable supply side change  
increases the equilibrium MC of a patent production (compare the point A 
and the point C in Figure1).   
                    ( F i g u r e   1 )  
Higher efficiency of product innovation can also reduce the marginal 
productivity of R&D in the equilibrium, when a firm can introduce a new 
product complementary to the existing products. In this case the MR curve 
can be upward-sloping, since introduction of a new product enhances the 
demand for the other products and expands the scope of complementarity, as 
shown in Figure 2. In addition, the expansion of the portfolio of products 
causes the expansion of the supply of existing products (q”>q’), which in turn 
can enhance the marginal revenue from innovations. Thus, a favorable 
supply side change increases the equilibrium MC of a patent production in 
the case of product innovation too. Thus, we have the following proposition.   
                     ( F i g u r e   2 )  
Proposition 2 
A favorable supply side change shifting up the marginal productivity 
schedule of R&D can reduce the marginal productivity of R&D in 
equilibrium.  
(See Appendix 1 for a formal proof) 
If we assume that marginal and average productivities move in the 
same directionx, the proposition 2 holds for the average productivity of R&D 
as well. If R&D output and its marginal productivity move in the same 
direction, it does indicate that a supply side factor is involved. However, the  11
fact that they move in the opposite direction does not indicate that the source 
of variation is on the demand side. As a result, the sign of the coefficient of a 
particular exogenous variable in a reduced form R&D productivity equation 
cannot provide sufficient information with respect to the channel by which 
such variable works through.   
Let us consider the logarithmic linearization of the reduced form 
patent and R&D equations (3) and (4):   
b db a da Z dZ R R / / / β α + =                                  ( 7 )  
b db a da b db Z dZ rd rd d R R R R / ) ( / / / ) /( ) ( δ γβ γα δ γ − + = − =  (8) 
Here the inverse of the parameter γ indicates the economy of scale in 
patent production with respect to R&D investment. The comparison of 
equations (7) and (8) suggests the following proposition, which would help 
interpreting the econometric results and identification. 
Proposition 3 
Assume that a logarithmic linearization gives a good approximation of 
reduced form R&D and patent equations. If there is a slight diseconomy of 
scale ( 1 0 , 1 << < + = ρ ρ γ ), the demand side factor has a larger coefficient in 
R&D equation and the supply side factor has a larger coefficient in patent 
equation. 
 
IV Framework for empirical analysis 
IV (i). Statistical Specification 
We estimate reduced-form R&D and patent functions (equations (3) and (4)) 
as well as the structural patent production function (equation (1)). The  12
comparison of the structural and reduced form equations helps us identify 
the channel by which a specific determinant of R&D works through. The 
supply side factors affect the patent equation (1) directly, while the demand 
side factors affect the patent production only through their effects on R&D 
investment. Thus, if a factor is found to be significant only in equations (3) 
and (4) but not in equation (1), we can infer that it works only from the 
demand sidexi. We use instrumental variables approach to control the 
endogeneity of independent variables such as the initial firm size and R&D 
investment. While we control industry fixed effects, we will not directly 
control firm-level fixed effects due to our data constraint, in particular, with 
respect to the available time period of data (see Appendix 2 for the 
explanations of data sources).   
The R&D and patent reduced form equations are specified for firm j 
in industry J as follows:   
j IND j j j j d b a d Z or D R µ ϕ δ + + + + = ) (log ) & (log .       ( 9 )  
The independent variable aj stands for a set of demand side factors of firm j. 
The variable bj   stands for a set of supply side factors. We use the initial firm 
size as represented by its sales (s0) , the HHI index, export sales ratio (exp0) , 
advertising sales ratio (advs0) and debt asset ratio (da0) as firm-level 
variables (aj  or bj ) (The list of all variables are given in Table 1). We do not 
know a priori whether the initial firm size, for an example, belongs to aj , bj  
or both. It may have a positive effect on R&D by enhancing the 
appropriability of its R&D investment, to the extent that it represents the 
size of assets complementary to R&D or the initial production cost level. It  13
may also promote R&D from a supply side, to the extent that it represents 
the size of larger knowledge stock specific to a firm.   
                          ( T a b l e   1 )  
We specify the HHI index of a multi-product firm as a weighted 
average index of its HHI in each industry, with its sales in each industry as a 
weight. Since many firms operate in more than one industry, a firm in the 
same industry faces a different overall market structurexii. Such variation 
allows us to identify the effect of market structure, even if we use only 
cross-section data and use industry dummies at three digit level (77 or 78 
industry dummies). The set of dind represents industry dummies, controlling 
both technological opportunities, demand growth rates, patenting 
propensities and the other industry-level factors. Finallyμj is a firm specific 
error term (either demand or supply side) , such as management or R&D 
capability, which are unaccounted for by an initial firm size and the other 
firm level explanatory variables .   
It is very likely that there a positive correlation between a firm 
specific error term μj and the initial firm size. Such correlation can cause a 
spurious positive correlation between the initial firm size and the production 
of patents or R&D. In order to address this, we use the age of a firm (age) as 
an instrument for the initial firm size. It is well-known that firm age has a 
systematic correlation with the size of a firm. On the other hand, age is likely 
to be far less correlated with a firm specific error term than the initial firm 
size. Although there may exist experience effects in management and R&D, 
the stylized fact that an older firm statistically performs worse than the  14
average suggests that they may not be very strong. We assume that the 
instrument and the rest of the explanatory variables are independent ofμj. 
We specify the structural patent production function for firm j in 
industry J as follows for a given period:   
j IND j j j j c b rdgr rd c Z ε β θ φ + + + + + = ) log( ) log( log .       ( 1 0 )  
In this equation, φis the elasticity of patent production with respect to the 
scale of a firm (not with respect to R&D (rd), since we use an intensity form 
for the explanatory variable of the initial size of a firm). We introduce the 
growth of R&D investment (rdgr) as a variable to control the tendency of 
underestimating the patent production of a firm with fast growing R&D 
investment due to the lag between R&D and patent grants. The variable bj 
stands for a set of firm-level supply side factors: the logarithm of the ratio 
between the initial size of a firm (sales or asset level) and R&D investment 
(s0rd or asset0rd), its export orientation at the beginning of the period (exp0), 
and the HHI index at a firm level (hhi0). The elasticity of patent production 
with respect to R&D is given by rd s0 ln β φ − . The variable cJ stands for a set of 
industry dummies, controlling the differences in technological opportunities 
and in patenting propensities across industries.  j ε  is a firm specific 
productivity term on the supply side. 
Although  j ε  is clearly correlated with rdj, most existing studies have 
not controlled it, as pointed out by Griliches (1995)xiii. We use advertising 
intensity (advs0) and debt asset ratio (da0) as instruments for R&D and its 
growth. Advertising helps a firm to establish its brand, which will in turn  15
help a firm recover the cost of R&D. That is, advertising enhances the 
appropriability of R&D investment. Similarly, high debt of a firm would 
increase the opportunity cost of capital for the firm, so that it would 
negatively affect R&D. On the other hand, both of them would not directly 
affect the patent production function. We will also use the log of firm age as 
an instrument for the initial firm size. We will not instrument export ratio, 
due to the absence of proper instruments. We assume that the rest of bj  as 
well as the instruments are independent of  j ε . 
IV (ii).    Sample and data   
Our sample is extracted from the compulsory survey on the Japanese firms 
(the Basic Survey of Business Structure and Activity), based on the 
conditions that the firm reports positive R&D in all survey years and it has a 
positive number of registered patents and utility models in 1991 FY and 
1999FY. It covers 2069 firms (see Appendix 2 for details). They 
predominantly belong to manufacturing firmsxiv.  
    As a measure of R&D output, we use the estimated number of the 
patents and utility models that each Japanese firm had internally developed 
and registered with the domestic and foreign patent offices during a 
eight-year period from the beginning of 1992 FY to the end of 1999 FY. Since 
the statistical survey from which our data is extracted asks a firm to report 
only the number of patents and utility models (hereafter, patents) 
maintained by each firm at the end of the fiscal year, we estimate the 
number of patents registered during this period, based on the survival data 
of patents (see the Appendix 2 for a method). Since the patent data covers  16
both domestic and foreign patents, the same invention is counted more than 
twicexv when registered in more than two countries. Since a firm tends to 
seek foreign patents for an invention with higher quality, given additional 
costs of foreign patent applications, adding both domestic and foreign 
patents together is very likely to increase the value of patent counting as an 
indicator of the research output. In addition, the export ratio of a firm (exp0), 
which we will introduce as one of the explanatory variables in equations (9) 
and (10), will control the duplicative aspect of foreign patents, if it is 
important. Thus, the coefficient of the export ratio may reflect both 
technology spillover from exports and the duplicative effects of foreign 
patents. 
  As for R&D input, we use the R&D expenditure used internally 
within the firm for its own sake, so that our measure of R&D expenditure 
excludes the R&D expenditure commissioned out by a firm. Such measure of 
R&D input is consistent with the R&D output defined above. Given a 
significant time lag between R&D expenditure and patent registrationxvi, we 
use the average R&D expenditure of a firm for the period from 1991FY to 
1997FY (rd) and its growth rate in this period (rdgr), as the input measures 
of R&D. The firm with a rapidly growing R&D expenditure would have 
smaller patent output for a given level of recent R&D expenditures, given the 
lag between R&D and patents grants as well as due to a lower level of past 
R&D expenditure. The growth rate of R&D controls this effect. Table 1 
provides brief explanations and summary statistics of all variables.  17
V Estimation results and discussions 
We estimated the above equations, using both OLS and instrumental 
variables method. We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, 
specifying a cluster for each of three -digit industries.   
V.1 Estimation of reduced form R&D and patent equations   
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (9). The firm size (lnsl0) has 
a highly positive coefficient both in the R&D and patent equations. The 
estimated coefficients based on instrumental variables regression 
(estimation I and III) are very close to one (1.01 for R&D and 1.06 for patent). 
Thus, there is no sign that the average R&D productivity declines 
significantly with firm size, unlike the past findings, including Doi (1993) 
and by Wakasugi et al (1996) on Japanese firms. The difference is due to our 
use of an instrumental variable for firm size, since the OLS estimation 
results in a significantly lower coefficient for firm size in the patent 
production function (1.07 for R&D and 0.93 for patent). Thus, the stylized 
fact of declining R&D average productivity with firm size can be significantly 
due to a regression bias. 
                            ( T a b l e   2 )  
One explanation for the above findings is the bias due to the positive 
correlation between the initial firm size and a supply-side component of a 
firm specific error term. A firm with higher R&D efficiency is likely to have a 
large initial firm size (lns0), since such capability is likely to be a long-lasting 
asset. The bias due to such correlation is larger in the patent equation than 
in the R&D equation if the return to scale in patent production is close to one.  18
This is because a supply-side component of an error term has two offsetting 
effects on R&D (compare equations (7) and (8)). That is, higher R&D 
capability of a firm reduces R&D investment for a given level of patents, but 
it also enhances patent production itself.   
With respect to the estimation of the coefficients of the other 
independent variables, we focus on instrumental variables estimation 
(estimation I and III). HHI index has a significant and positive coefficient for 
R&D equation, implying that the R&D investment of a firm is high relative 
to its sales when it operates in more concentrated industries on the average, 
even controlling for the effects of its size and industries. However, it is not 
significant in patent equation.  Export ratio has a significant and positive 
coefficient in both R&D and patent equations. We cannot definitely tell 
whether market concentration and export ratio affect R&D and/or patent 
production from the demand side or supply side without directing estimating 
a structural patent equation. However both having a significantly larger 
elasticity in R&D equation than in patent equation suggests that they work 
more from the demand side (see Proposition 3)xvii. 
  Two instruments for R&D investment in the structural patent 
equation have expected signs in both estimations I and III. Debt asset ratio 
is highly significant in both equations. It reduces both R&D and patent 
production, given the initial firm size and the other explanatory variables, 
consistent with a theoretical prediction that higher opportunity cost of 
capital reduces demand for R&D. Advertising sales ratio (advs0) has a 
significant coefficient only in R&D equation. Its positive sign is consistent  19
with a theoretical prediction that advertising encourages R&D through 
enhancing the latter’s appropriability.   
V.2. Estimation of structural patent production function 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the structural patent equation 
(10). We use two measures of the initial firm size: sales and asset. We use age, 
debt asset ratio, and advertising sales ratio as instruments for R&D, its 
growth and the initial firm size. The OLS regressions (Estimation I and III) 
suggest that the initial size of a firm and its export ratio are significant in 
enhancing patent production (but not market concentration). They also 
suggest that there is a very strong diminishing return to R&D in patent 
production. In particular, according to estimation I, the elasticity with 
respect to the sales over R&D ratio is 0.43 and export sales ratio has the 
coefficient of 0.97, implying that 10% point increase of export sales ratio 
results in 10 % point increase of patent productivity. On the other hand, the 
elasticity of patent production with respect to scale is only 0.47 so that the 
elasticity with respect to R&D is only 0.04 (=0.47-0.43).   
                    ( T a b l e   3 )  
Instrumental variables regressions (estimation II and IV), however, 
show a significantly different picture. Neither the initial firm size nor its 
export orientation enhances its R&D productivity of a firm, while the return 
to scale in patent production is less than but close to one. In both estimations, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the return to scale is one. In addition, 
the elasticity with respect to R&D is estimated to be 0.88 (estimation II) and 
0.85 (estimation IV), so that the diminishing return with respect to R&D is  20
not very strong, although it is less precisely estimated. On the other hand, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the initial firm size, the HHI index and 
the initial export orientation have individually zero coefficients. The 
estimation bias due to the correlation between a firm specific error and the 
initial firm size would explain the difference between the OLS and 
instrumental variables estimations. 
Since a firm size as represented by its sales is significant only in 
reduced form equations, we can infer that it affects R&D only from the 
demand side at its margin. That is, a firm size as represented by its sales or 
its asset affects positively its R&D only from the demand side by improving 
its appropriability, but it does not represent a supply side factor such as the 
firm specific knowledge stock. Similarly, while market concentration and 
export ratio are significant in the reduced form R&D equation, it is not 
significant in the structural patent production function. These results 
indicate that they do not represent the supply side factor, such as the level of 
technology spillover, but the demand side factor affecting the appropriability 
from R&D investment.   
VI Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to identify the channels by which such factors as 
an initial firm size and market competition affect R&D and its productivity. 
Main findings are the following. First, it has theoretically shown that, while 
a favorable demand side change shifting up the marginal revenue curve of 
R&D reduces the marginal R&D productivity in equilibrium, a favorable 
supply side change shifting up the marginal productivity curve of R&D can  21
also reduce the marginal R&D productivity in equilibrium in both process 
and product innovations. This can happen if the induced expansion of R&D 
investment is large and the diminishing return to R&D exists. This finding 
implies that the information based on the reduced form estimation of R&D 
productivity does not provide definitive information on whether an 
exogenous factor affects a demand or supply side of R&D (more 
predominantly).  
Second, the paper estimated both structural and reduced form patent 
production function, using instrumental variables approach, based on a large 
scale database on Japanese firms. Major empirical findings are the following:   
(1) None of the initial firm size as represented by sales or assets, market 
concentration, or export orientation significantly shifts the structural 
patent production function.   
(2) Initial firm size, export orientation and, less significantly, market 
concentration significantly enhances R&D in a reduced form. Thus, they 
look to affect R&D mainly from a demand side. 
(3) The stylized fact of declining R&D average productivity with firm size can 
be significantly due to a regression bias (the endogeneity of firm size).   
  One major constraint of this paper is that it does not fully control 
firm level fixed effects. This might have caused an estimation bias, especially, 
in the effects of export orientation. While the limitation of the available data 
and difficulty of identifying lag structure between R&D and patent grants 
prevented us from using fixed effect estimation in this exercise, we plan to 
extend the work in the near future.    22
Appendix 1.    A negative response of R&D productivity to an improved R&D 
efficiency  
  The profit of a firm is given by 
) , ( ) , , ( ) , , , ( b Z rd a q Z R b a q Z V − =                                 ( a . 1 ) ,  
, and the profit maximizing level of Z and q are given by 
Z b Z rd MC a q Z Z R MR ∂ ∂ = = ∂ ∂ = / ) , ( ) , , ( / .                         ( a . 2 )            
, and 
0 ) , , ( / = ∂ ∂ a q Z q R .                                            ( a . 3 )             
The responses of the optimal Z and q to b are given by differentiating 

























                                         ( a . 4 )  
, where 
, / / Z MC Z MR A ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ =  
, / q MR B ∂ ∂ =   
, / ) , , , (
2 2 q b a q Z R C ∂ ∂ =   
0 / ) , ( < ∂ ∂ = b b Z MC E .  
If we denote the determinant of the above matrix by D=AC-B2, we have the 
following second order conditions for a profit maximization choice: 
D > 0   a n d   A ,   C < 0                                       ( a . 5 )  
The response of MC (or the inverse of marginal R&D productivity) to a 
supply side change can be assessed by using its equality to MR in the 
equilibrium:  
qdq a q Z MR ZdZ a q Z MR dMR ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = / ) , , ( / ) , , (                       ( a . 6 ) .   
First, we discuss a case of process innovation. A firm sells its product  23
for price p(q, u), where u represents the factors exogenous to the firm, such 
as income and market structure. Let us consider a two-period model where a 
firm invests in R&D in the first period and its output can be commercialized 
in the second period. The unit cost of production c depends on the number of 
patents Z, which the firm will be granted for its inventions. Thus, we have 
) 1 /( )] ( ) , ( [ ) , , , ( r q Z c u q p r u q Z R + − =                              ( a . 7 ) ,   
where r is interest rate. The firm chooses Z and q, so as to maximize V. Given 
the envelope theorem, the marginal revenue of Z is given 
by ) 1 /( ) / ( ) , ( r q Z c r q MR + ∂ −∂ = , and the optimal level of patent production is 
given by 
Z b Z rd r q Z c MR ∂ ∂ = + ∂ −∂ = / ) , ( ) 1 /( ) / ( .                              ( a . 8 )                 
    We assume that a firm can reduce its constant marginal cost of 
production by Z, according to c =c0 – Z, with c 0 being the initial level of 
constant marginal cost of production. In this case, marginal revenue of 
patent production is constant for a given q:  
) 1 /( ) 1 /( ) / ( r q r q Z c MR + = + ∂ −∂ = .                             ( a . 9 )       
,as shown in Figure 1 in the main text. MR increases with q, since the firm 
can apply more widely the knowledge produced by R&D.   
The optimal level of q is given by 
0 } / ) , ( { )] ( ) , ( [ 0 = ∂ ∂ + − − q q u q p Z c u q p .                      ( a . 1 0 )  
q increases with Z and decreases with c0, since larger price cost margin 
encourages a firm to expand supply. The responses of the optimal Z and q to 
db are given by the solutions of the equation (a.4): 
dZ=ECdb/D  > 0                                                   ( a . 1 1 )     24
a n d                                         
d q = - B E d b / D   > 0 ,                                                  (a.12) 
, since we have  ) 1 /( 1 / r q MR B + = ∂ ∂ = >0. 
From (a.6), the change of MR in response to  db  is given by   
0 ) 1 /( > + = r dq dMR                                               ( a . 1 3 )  
, since we have  0 / = ∂ ∂ Z MR from (a.9).  Thus, a positive supply side change 
shifting down the marginal cost schedule of patent production results in the 
increase of the marginal cost (or the decrease of marginal productivity of 
R&D) in equilibrium in this case of process innovation. The reason for this 
result is easily seen from equation (a.9). A larger b invites the increase of q, 
which in turn enhances the marginal revenue of R&D investment. This leads 
to the expansion of rd  to such an extent that the marginal cost of R&D 
investment increases.   
Second, let us consider the following case of product innovation, 
where a firm chooses an introduction of a new product complementary to the 
existing products. The number of products sold by a firm is given by Z, which 
is equal to the number of patents, and the price of each product (p(q,Z;u)) 
depends on how many products a firm sells in the market, in addition to the 
amount of the sales of each product (q) and the other exogenous factors as 
represented by u. We assume that 
  0 / > ∂ ∂ Z p ,                                      ( a . 1 4 )  
due to the complementarity of consumption of the products sold by a firm.   
The value of R&D investment is given by 
) , ( ) 1 /( } ) ; , ( { ) , ( b Z k r Zq c u Z q p q Z V − + − =  ,                        ( a . 1 5 )   25
, where c is a constant marginal cost of production and r is interest rate. The 
marginal revenue of inventions is given by   
) 1 /( )} ( ) / {( ) , , ; , ( r q c p Z Z p r c u q Z MR + − + ∂ ∂ = ,                   ( a . 1 6 )  
MR curve is up-ward sloping with Z, unless p is strongly concave to the 
origin with respect to Z. That is, we assume that 
0 ) 1 /( } / 2 ) / {( / ) , ; , (
2 2 > + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ r q Z p Z Z p Z r u q Z MR .          ( a . 1 7 )  
The profit-maximizing level of patent production is given by the 
intersection of the MR and MC curves:   
) , ( ) , , ; , ( b Z MC r c u q Z MR = .                                        ( a . 1 8 )  
The optimal q is given by a standard profit maximization condition: 
0 ) ( ) / ( = − + ∂ ∂ c p q q p .                                            ( a . 1 9 )  
    With respect to the conditions associated with matrix (a.4), using the 
condition (a.19), we have   
0 ) 1 /( } ) / ( / { /
2 > + ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = r Z q q Z p Z p q MR B ,                      ( a . 2 0 )  
, unless  q Z p ∂ ∂ ∂ /
2   is significantly negative. We assume that such is the case. 
Then, we have  0 / > ∂ ∂ b Z  and 0 / > ∂ ∂ b q , as in equations (a.11) and (a.12). 
Consequently, the derivative of MR with respect to  db  is also positive:   
0 / / ) , ; , ( > ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = qdq MR ZdZ r u q Z MR dMR                           ( a . 2 1 ) ,  
from equations (a.17) and (a.20). Given the equality of MC and MR in the 
equilibrium, a positive supply side change shifting down the marginal cost 
schedule of patent production causes an increase of the marginal cost in the 
equilibrium.  26
Appendix  2.  Statistical  data 
(1) Data source 
We use the firm level data from the Basic Survey of Business Structure and 
Activity (Kigyoukatudou-kihonnchousa) by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry. The Survey has been made for business activities in 1991FY, 
1994FY and every year thereafter. It covers all firms with more than 50 
engaged workers and with capital more than 30 million Yen in 
manufacturing, mining, retail and wholesale distribution, and restaurant 
and drinking places. It is a compulsory survey. Our data is extracted from 
the database of the Basic Survey, based on the conditions that the firm 
reports positive R&D investments for all five years (1991FY, 1994FY, 1995FY, 
1996FY and 1997FY) and it has a positive number of registered patents and 
utility models in 1991FY and 1999FY.   
(2) Estimates of registered number of patents and utility models   
We estimate the number of patents and utility models registered during the 
period between 1992FY and 1999FY from the data on the stock number of 
patent and utility models that a firm maintained at the end of the 1991FY 
and 1999FY. The Japanese Patent Office annually publishes the survival 
rates of patents and utility models registered domestically for each year in 
the past. Thus, we can estimate the aggregate age distribution of patents 
and utility models effective at the end of 1991CY. According to this 
calculation, for an example, 49% of the effective patents and 57% of effective 
utility models effective in 1991CY were registered within the preceding 5 
years. This profile can be used to estimate how many of the utility and  27
patent models effective at the beginning of 1992FY would have remained 
effective at the end of 1999FY, or in 8 years later. According to the calculation, 
23.9 % of patents had remained effective and 8.3% of utility models had 
remained effective. Since the number of effective patents was 506 thousands 
and that of effective utility models was 384 thousands at the end of 1991CY, 
the average survival rate is estimated to be 17.2%. Thus, the number of 
patents and utility models registered for the eight year period can be 
estimated by subtracting 17.2% of the stock number of the patent and utility 
model at the end of 1991FY from that at the end of 1999 FY. We omitted the 
data of 65 firms, for which the above procedure resulted in zero or negative 
counts, since they are more likely to be outliers in patenting behaviors. They 
are only a small part of the total sample.   
(3)Market structure (concentration) at a firm level(hhi0) 
The market is defined at three-digit industry level and the market share is 
defined based on the sales (domestic and export sales) of each firm in 1991FY 
and does not take into account import competition. When a firm operates in 
more than one industry, we use a weighted average index of HHI, with its 
sales in each industry as a weight.    28
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i It is important to distinguish the demand for R&D from the demand for goods. The 
entry of a new firm will reduce the demand for the goods produced by existing firms, but 
may increase their demand for R&D.   
ii Schumpeter (1942) pointed out that a large firm had advantages over a small firm 
both in demand and supply sides of R&D.     
iii Grossman and Helpman (1991) built a model of endogenous growth based on 
technological spillover through international trade. 
iv Competition may weaken appropriability of R&D investment by reducing the size of 
output of each firm and by increasing the chances for the outputs of R&D being copied. 
Thus, the net demand side effect of competition on R&D is ambiguous theoretically. The 
net effect of competition on the efficiency of motivating managers is also generally 
ambiguous (see Nickell (1996)). 
v  See Cohen (1995) for a survey of such literature. 
vi As pointed out by Fisher and Temin (1973), however, the relationship between firm 
size and R&D input has little direct implications on economy of scales in R&D.   
vii While the following propositions mainly refer to the empirical evidence based on the 
U.S. or U.K. industry, Wakasugi et al (1996) and Doi (1993) provides evidence consistent 
with the following first and second propositions for the Japanese industry.   
viii They also show that that R&D size relationship is weaker in the industries where 
licensing is important. 
ix  The declining average productivity implies the following: k Z MZ k Z AZ ∂ ∂ = > = / / . 
x  Such is the case for a geometric patent production function (
α bk Z = ).    30
                                                                                                                                                  
xi Since we do not estimate a marginal revenue curve of technologies (or a demand 
function for technologies), we can tell at best whether a particular determinant of R&D 
works through the supply side or not, but not whether they work only through the 
supply side. 
xii For an example, the HHI in the pharmaceutical industry ranges from 0.0141 to 
0.0527, with the mean 0.0192 and the standard deviation of 0.0060 for 71 firms.   
xiii One of his proposals is to use factor prices as instruments. The debt asset ratio of a 
firm used in this paper can be regarded to be an application of this proposal.   
xiv There exist 1843 manufacturing firms, 176 wholesale firms and 34 construction 
firms and the other 16 firms.. 
xv The Japanese firms applied 340,861 domestic patens and 190,895 foreign patents in 
1996 ( JPO(2000)). The number of the patent applications to the USA was 43,156.   
xvi In Japan patent application is examined only after the patent applicant requests 
that. It used to be the case that a patent applicant can defer examination up to seven 
years after the submission of patent applications (this period was reduced to three years 
in  2000).   
xvii This is particularly the case for export ratio, since its coefficient in the patent 
equation may be inflated by our use of the patents granted both domestically and 
abroad, to the extent that foreign patents may have a duplicative aspect. (Figures and Tables)























CTable 1  Summary statistics
Variable Meaning Explanation Obs Mean Std. Dev.
z
No. of patents and utility models granted for
internally generated inventions
Estimated number of the patents and utility
models granted globally  from the beginning of
1992 FY to the end of 1999 FY 2069 292 1999
rd R&D expenditure  internally used the average R&D expenditure of a firm for the
period from 1991FY to 1997FY 2069 2633 16960
rdgr growth rate of rd from 1991FY to 1997FY 2069 0.032 0.185
s0 sales the level of sales of each firm in 1991 FY 2069 73173 281258
asset0 asset size the asset size (a book value) in 1991FY 2069 19095 72021
s0rd
sales relative to R&D s0/rd; lns0rd=ln(s0/rd)
2069 183 468
asset0rd asst relative to R&D asset0/rd;  lnasset0rd=ln(asset0/rd) 2069 43 122
hhi0
Herfindhal-Hirshman index a weighted average index of HHI, with its sales
in each industry as a weight, based on markets
shares of the firms in 1991FY 2069 0.0335 0.0264
exp0 export sales ratio in 1991FY ln1exp0=ln(1+exp0) 2069 0.073 0.123
age




advertising sales ratio in FY 1991
ln1advs0=ln(1+advs0) 2069 0.009 0.020
da0
debt asset ratio in 1994 FY









lns0 1.014 0.048 *** 1.069 0.019 *** 1.063 0.083 *** 0.930 0.028 ***
lnhhi0 0.147 0.069 ** 0.131 0.067 * 0.075 0.078 0.116 0.068 *
ln1exp0 2.492 0.357 *** 2.264 0.354 *** 1.408 0.601 ** 1.963 0.571 ***
ln1advs0 3.833 2.130 * 3.695 2.187 * 3.593 2.819 3.928 2.673
ln1da0 -1.302 0.218 *** -1.248 0.218 *** -0.827 0.250 *** -0.959 0.239 ***
R-squared
Root MSE




I Reduced form R&D equation
(lnrd)
III Reduced form patent
equation (lnZ)
0.783 0.590
77 industry dummies and constant are used. Values for industry dummies and for constants are not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported, with 77 clusters corresponding to three-digit industries.
***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5% level.*Significant at 10% level.
OLS Estimation IV　(lnage for lns0) IV　(lnage for lns0) OLS














lnrd 0.473 0.032 *** 0.948 0.230 *** 0.838 0.023 *** 0.938 0.130 ***
rdgr -0.067 0.168 -3.860 7.777 -0.085 0.175 -3.954 6.854
lns0rd 0.429 0.049 *** 0.069 0.726
lnasset0rd 0.283 0.041 *** 0.090 0.935
lnhhi0 0.057 0.072 -0.021 0.092 0.070 0.072 -0.011 0.149
ln1exp0 0.973 0.474 ** -0.758 1.256 0.863 0.468 * -0.683 1.973
R-squared
Root MSE
78 industry dummies and constant are used. Values for industry dummies and for constants are not reported.
1.442 1.198
Table 3. Estimation of structural patent production function with three-digit industry dummies (number of obs=2069, 78 industry
dummies)
I. Structural patent equation
(lnZ)
0.645
***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5% level.*Significant at 10% level.
Estimation OLS
II. Structural patent equation
(lnZ)
IV. Structural patent equation (lnZ)
0.488
1.439
IV (Instruments: lnage ln1advs0




IV (Instruments: lnage ln1advs0




Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported, with 78 clusters corresponding to three-digit industries.